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STATE PREPARATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR FEDERALLY
AIDED HIGHWAY PROGRAMS
I. Introduction
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed by
Congress in 1969, has been called "the broadest and perhaps most
important of the recent statutes . .. [which attempt] . . . to con-
trol . . . the destructive engine of material progress. "I Despite such
plaudits, NEPA has been the target of much critical legal commen-
tary3 and the source of much litigation in the federal courts.4 Consid-
erable controversy has centered on what is considered the core of
NEPA: the required filing of an environmental impact statement
(EIS) by agencies undertaking "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment . . ."I NEPA's
failure to specify the detail necessary for a satisfactory EIS and the
party responsible for preparing it has led to considerable litigation,6
most of which has arisen from the construction of federally aided
highways.7
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1976).
2. Clavert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3. Kross, Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 81
(1972); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509 (1974); Note, Major Federal Actions Under the National Environmental Policy Act,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 580, 590 & n.77-81 (1975).
4. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766
(7th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Greene Cty. Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1970). Almost every word and phrase of this passage, because
of its broad and qualitative nature, has spawned a judicial history all its own. See Note, supra
note 3, at 590.
6. Cady v. Morton, No. 74-1984 (9th Cir., June 19, 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d
856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Greene Cty. Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7. See Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); National Forest Preservation
Group v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252 (W.D.
Wash. 1972); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F.Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified,
484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
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The legislative history and judicial treatment of NEPA make it
clear that federally aided highway construction falls within the
ambit of NEPA.5 As of November, 1972, 47 percent (1,681) of 3,553
of all EISs submitted to the Council on Enviornmental Quality
(CEQ) involved highway projects.' In deciding the initial question
of whether the particular project is a "major Federal action" war-
ranting EIS preparation, a project is considered federal from the
time of state application for federal funds, federal approval, or ac-
tive federal agency involvement in project planning.'"
Responsibility for preparing the EIS has not been so firmly estab-
lished. NEPA required that the federal agencies make the EIS
"available to the President, the CEQ and to the public"" but did
not expressly forbid the delegation of the preparation of the state-
ment. Thus the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the
Department of Transportation (DOT), at first by custom"2 and then
by memorandum,'" delegated this responsibility to the individual
states. This practice led to a conflict in the courts as to the permissi-
ble scope of the delegation.'4 In order to resolve this controversy,
Congress amended NEPA in 1975 to legalize the delegation and also
8. 115 CONG. REC. 40425 (1969)(remarks of Senators Muskie and Randolph); see Arlington
Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972);
Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
9. Talbott, Prospect '73, HIGHWAY USER, Jan., 1973, at 9. A major area of litigation con-
cerned which projects were so far progressed that compliance with NEPA might be too
impractical or too wasteful. See Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1330-
34 (4th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 624
(3d Cir. 1971). See also 69 MicH. L. REV. 732.
10. CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1976); see Named Individual Members of San
Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F.Supp. 132 (N.D.
Ca. 1971). See also Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
12. Francis Turner, the Federal Highway Administrator of DOT, told the Senate Public
Works Committee, Subcommittee on Roads, on August 25, 1970, that the sheer size of the
highway program made such delegation inevitable. Reilly, The National Environmental Pol-
icy Act and the Federal Highway Program: Merging Administrative Traffic, 20 CATH. U. L.
REV. 21, 35 (1970). Thus administrative weight was recognized early as the reason for the
delegation to the states of the EIS preparation.
13. Environmental Impact and Related Statements, PPM 90-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 21809, 21810
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PPM 90-1]. The states are delegated the responsibility for both
a draft EIS and a final EIS, both of which must be made available to the public. See Hearings
on Red Tape Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight on the House Comm. on
Public Works, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 261-63 (1971).
14. See notes 67, 76 infra and accompanying text.
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NOTES
to provide certain procedural safeguards against possible adverse
effects.' 5 Specifically, the amendment requires that the appropriate
federal official furnish guidance and participation in the prepara-
tion of the statement, that he evaluate the statement prior to its
approval and adoption, and that notification and solicitation be
made to any other state or federal land management entity which
may be affected by the action in question. This note will analyze
the problems that these amendments (Act) addresses and evaluate
its probable effectiveness.
II. Historical Background
The April 23, 1971, CEQ guidelines 6 made clear that the federal
agency had final responsibility for the EIS, 7 but there was nothing
mandating actual preparation by the agency or forbidding delega-
tion to an applicant. A memorandum, issued by the CEQ in 1972,
delegated primary responsibility for the initiation, planning, and
construction of federally aided highways to state highway commis-
sions."8 The same state highway commissions were explicitly made
responsible for preparation of both a draft EIS and a final impact
statement. 1
There was an implicit danger, however, that state highway com-
missioners were not capable of the objectivity required for a suffi-
cient EIS. ° Since the EIS requires the inclusion of alternatives to
the proposed action,2' the state highway commissions were faced
with the situation of recommending other forms of transportation or
canceling the project entirely.22
The problems created by this delegation are complex and inter-
15. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
4332(2)(D)-(I) (Supp. 1976)) [hereinafter cited as Act].
16. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1976). These final guidelines replaced the interim guidelines issued
April 30, 1970. The interim and final guidelines are essentially the same. See text accompany-
ing note 10 supra.
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1976); see National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F.
Supp. 123, 125 (D. Mont. 1972).
18. PPM 90-1, § 3(e).
19. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 53-75 infra and accompanying text.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1970).
22. The limitations on the use of the Highway Trust Fund, until recently, made the
consideration of some alternatives of little practical significance. See notes 48-57 infra.and
accompanying text.
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twined, but may be grouped into three areas: (1) whether the federal
agency (FHWA) ultimately responsible for the EIS provides a de-
gree of review and participation in the EIS preparation;" (2)
whether state, rather than federal, preparation of the EIS precludes
a sufficiently broad overview for a serious consideration of all the
valid alternatives;24 and (3) whether the state highway departments
have certain inherent biases, which render them unable (or unwill-
ing) to provide objective evaluation and make the potentially diffi-
cult sacrifices that NEPA requires. 5
III. FHWA Participation in the EIS Preparation
Scherr v. Volpe2" established the principle of judicial review of
FHWA actions in the highway construction area. In Scherr, the
Wisconsin Department of Highways and FHWA concluded that an
EIS was not required with respect to a certain 12 mile project. The
court disagreed, finding it difficult to understand how the federal
authority might have concluded that such a project was not suffi-
ciently major to invoke the EIS requirement. It noted with disfavor
the absence of an explanation by either the state or the FHWA.27
Most of the "highway" cases following Scherr have not concerned
this threshold question of whether the project came under NEPA.
Rather, they involved the sufficiency of the impact statement. In
Daly v. Volpe,2" a state-prepared draft EIS was found to have been
inadequately considered by the FHWA. The FHWA approval came
on the day following receipt of the statement. The court directed
that "[tihe statute [NEPA] contemplates more deliberation than
the time required to use a rubber stamp."29
In Swain v. Brinegare0 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the design approval given to a project after a final EIS
23. See notes 26-38 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 39-52 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 53-75 infra and accompanying text.
26. 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
27. Id. at 88-89. Plaintiffs were residents of Hartland, Wisconsin and members of various
conservation and environmental organizations, who contended that federal defendant Volpe
and his subordinates failed to comply with NEPA by filing an impact statement for a certain
project. Id.
28. 350 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
29. Id. at 259. This "rubber stamping" phraseology became a watch-word in the delega-
tion litigation and in the passage of the Act. See note 38 infra.
30. 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975).
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was submitted "in sum and substance. . . identical to the original
state-prepared draft . . . .".3 The Department of Interior had de-
scribed the draft as lacking in specific information and inadequately
treating the natural environmental resources.3" The EPA had sug-
gested that loss of farmland, ignored in the final EIS draft, could
be considered an adverse effect. Only two small sentences were
added, slighting the effects of the loss of over 700 acres of tillable
land. Regardless of this result, the FHWA approved.33
One independent study found that of 76 final EISs filed through
June, 1972, less than 25 percent received substantive comments by
DOT. 4 Because the memorandum makes no requirements of inde-
pendent fact finding by FHWA or DOT, the danger is real that they
will be unable "to pierce through the self-serving assumptions, gen-
eralities, and cliches upon which the impact statements may be
based."35
The drafters of the Act were aware of this concern. State prepara-
tion of the EIS is now permitted, but the amendment mandates
guidance and participation by the federal officials, as well as an
independent evaluation of the statement prior to approval and
adoption by the responsible federal official. The Act, however, does
not provide minimal levels of guidance and participation. Further-
more, it fails to mandate specific procedures which might insure
adequate supervision. The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Com-
mittee recommended two such procedures: documentation of
agency activities and maintenance of a highly trained interdisci-
plinary staff.3" Without these or similar requirements, it is conceiva-
ble that "rubber stamping" may still be a common practice.
31. Id. at 774-75.
32. Id. at 774 n.ll.
33. Id. at 774-75.
34. Sullivan & Montgomery, Surveying Highway Impact, ENVIRONMENT, Nov., 1972, at 13.
35. Id. at 15.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (2)(D)(ii) (Supp. 1976).
37. Id. § 4332(2)(D)(iii).
38. In order to avoid the danger . . . of constant judicial testing of whether the
degree of delegation of EIS preparation duties is permissible or impermissible, the
Committee strongly urges the participation in the preparation, and their independent
review, of the EIS. In particular, the Committee wishes to emphasize the necessity of
maintaining in each Federal agency, and fully using during the preparation and evalu-
ation of the EIS's, a highly trained and capable interdisciplinary staff. Both these
steps-documentation of agency activities and maintenance of the interdisiplinary
1976] NOTES
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IV. State Consideration of Alternatives
NEPA was intended to be broad and all inclusive in its concern
for the environment. 9 Federal agencies are to apply its provisions
to the "fullest extent possible."4 Also expressly required is the rec-
ognition of the "worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems. . .. "I' One of the specific elements to be
studied in the EIS is "the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
longterm productivity .. ". ."I' NEPA recognizes that "each 'lim-
ited' federal project is part of a large mosaic of thousands of similar
projects and that cumulative effects can and must be considered on
an ongoing basis."43 Thus, an EIS should consider the relation of the
particular project to the whole. Federal participation here is crucial,
as state highway departments cannot be expected to go beyond their
specific domains. The Seventh Circuit in Swain noted "state agen-
cies simply are not in a position to evaluate environmental conse-
quences of a national or worldwide scope."44 Given the congression-
ally declared national environmental policy, Swain found it "odd
that this central function [the EIS] should be delegated to state
officials who have little means, motivation or indeed power to effec-
tively coordinate such federal actions."45
According to the Senate Committee of Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, the Act would have answered this problem. As originally pro-
staff-are particularly important as a means of avoiding unnecessary litigation. When
H.R. 3130's [Act] provisions are working best-when the data and draft EIS provided
by the state agency or official are of high quality and require only modest changes by
the Federal official-the appearance of "rubber-stamping" is greatest. Proper docu-
mentation and use of staff are the best means of reassuring those who might level the
"rubber-stamping" charge, or, should the charge be made, of disproving it.
SEN. REP. No. 152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1975).
39. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1976); see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc., v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This phrase has been
extensively used in NEPA litigation, especially in the retroactivity cases. See Morningside-
Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971), citing CONF. R. No. 765, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(F) (Supp. 1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (1970).
43. 517 F.2d at 775.
44. Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 778 n.18.
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posed, it required "the Federal official to prepare independently for
the EIS the analysis of the impacts and alternatives of major inter-
state significance associated with the project or action which is the
subject of the EIS."45 However, the proviso which would have re-
quired such action was dropped from the final bill.47
The breadth of alternatives which should be considered in the EIS
is an area which is relatively unexplored.48 Most EISs include, as
they should, route alternatives and their various ramifications. But
recent changes in the availability of the Highway Trust Fund" could
turn the "alternatives" clause into a much more valuable aspect of
the EIS. Until passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973,1a the
Trust Fund was restricted in its availability solely to the construc-
tion and maintenance of federal aid highways.5' Now limited
amounts are available for urban mass transit; real alternatives here
include, at the very least, bus and rail lines, neither of which would
require further highway construction. When the alternatives to a
highway project were limited to roadbuilding, the consideration of
non-highway alternatives was little more than mental exercise and
paper waste. But now, in keeping with the broad scope of NEPA's
policy, inclusion of these new alternatives would increase the objec-
tivity and scope, and consequently the value, of the EIS.52
46. SEN. REP. No. 152, supra note 38, at 2.
47. See note 15 supra.
48. See Note, Environmental Impact Statements-A Duty of Independent Investigation
by Federal Agencies, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 161, 165-66 (1973).
49. The Highway Trust Fund was created by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub.
L. No. 84-627, § 209, 70 Stat. 374 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.); it is funded
by taxes on gasoline, motor oils, tires, and trucks. It was promulgated to help build a nation-
wide system of high speed, limited access highways and improved primary and secondary
roads. For a discussion of its history and purpose and the controversy surrounding its use,
see Note, The Highway Trust Fund: Road to Anti-Pollution?, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 171 (1970).
See also Comment, The Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements by State Highway
Commissions, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1268, 1271 n.29 (1973).
50. Act of Aug. 13, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 121(a), 87 Stat. 259. Trust funds allocated
to the federal-aid urban system will be available for the construction of fixed rail facilities
and the purchase of trains as well as buses for highway mass transit.
51. The Act restricted the use of the Fund to highway planning and construction, which
has enabled it to provide the 90 percent share of the federal government in the interstate
system and the lesser federal share of other federal-aid programs. See Note, supra note 49.
52. For a discussion of other methods of "Tinkering with the Financing Scheme," see
Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Con-
cerning Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 51 (1973).
Properly addressed, NEPA's requirement for analysis of alternatives to proposed
19761
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V. Objectivity of State Highway Commissions
The consideration of valid alternatives to highway building in-
cludes other modes of transportation and even the decision not to
build. 3 Such choices are antithetical to state highway officials
whose bias is toward highway construction. In several cases it was
found that states treated the EIS as only a procedural formality
preceding the assumed building of the highway.54 In one case,55 the
Iowa Highway Commission was ordered to halt a project until an
EIS was prepared." Immediately after the decision and prior to the
preparation, the chief engineer of the Highway Commission insisted
that the highway would still be constructed, and emphasized that
it would be built on the proposed route.57 Further, the Highway
Commission Chairman noted that EIS preparation would only
delay the project, not force its abandonment.5"
Litigation leading directly to the passage of the Act59 recognized
the potential for bias on the part of the states. In a non-highway
case, Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power
Commission,0 the FPC had delegated its EIS obligation for a pro-
legislation, plans, programs, and projects should entail an exploration of the suitability
of other modes of transportation to accommodate similar objectives with less environ-
mental disruption. Practically, however, a mass transit or commuter rail alternative
to an urban freeway is infeasible in the absence of comparable available funding.
Reilly, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Highway Program: Merging
Administrative Traffic, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 21, 24 (1970).
53. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971),
an injunction was granted in the construction of a dam across the Cossatot River. The reason
for the action was failure to comply with NEPA. In discussing the "alternatives" treatment
of the inadequate EIS, the court said: "The most glaring deficiency in this respect is the
failure to set forth and fully describe the alternative of leaving the Cossatot alone." Id. at
761. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
54. Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Named Individual Members of San
Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); No East-West Highway Comm., Inc. v. Whitaker, 403 F. Supp.
260 (D.N.H. 1975).
55. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972). This was
another case of piecemealing. A 14 mile project was split into 7 mile segments and an EIS
prepared for only one of the two. The court's decision called for a new EIS considering the
entire project. See Comment, supra note 49, at 1276-82.
56. 345 F. Supp. at 1172-73.
57. Comment, supra note 49, at 1278.
58. Id.
59. See SEN. REP. No. 152, supra note 38, at 1-2.
60. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); see Note, supra note 48.
NOTES
posed nuclear power plant to the Power Authority of the State of
New York (PASNY), arguing that its own statement was not re-
quired until its final decision.6 ' Stating that NEPA was a "mandate
to consider environmental values 'at every distinctive and compre-
hensive stage of the [agency's] process,' "62 the Second Circuit de-
clared that the FPC had: 3
[A]bdicated a significant part of its responsibility by substituting the state-
ment of PASNY for its own . . . .This danger of the procedure, and one
obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not the likelihood, that the appli-
cant's statement will be based upon self-serving assumptions ...
NEPA places the onus of formulating the statement solely on the [Federal
Power] Commission.
In applying the Greene County rationale, the court in Committee
to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe64 noted the same danger of bias and found
the same self-serving assumptions. The Connecticut DOT had al-
ready concluded in its draft EIS that the project would not signifi-
cantly affect the quality of man's environment, even though the
proposal was for a segment of a new four-lane 31 mile expressway
through virgin woods. 5
In Conservation Society v. Secretary of Transportation"6 the
district court found an inherent bias in favor of the proposed high-
way construction and in derogation of environmental considera-
tions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, saying
that delegating the duty to prepare an EIS is "unlikely to result
in as dispassionate an appraisal . . .as the federal agency itself
could produce."" A theme mentioned several times was that the
state agency (Vermont Highway Department) was established
to "pursue defined state goals,"6 6 which might conflict with an
objective assessment of environmental consequences. This theme
was also developed in No East-West Highway Committee, Inc. v.
61. 455 F.2d at 418-19.
62. Id. at 420.
63. Id. at 420, 423.
64. 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
65. Id. at 741.
66. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. 508 F.2d at 931.
68. 508 F.2d at 931; 362 F. Supp. at 633.
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Whitaker,9 in which New Hampshire's highway department re-
peatedly denied the existence of plans to construct a certain major
highway, after completing the first four of ten seriatim steps on the
way to such construction. The court stated that accepting this de-
nial as proof of the non-existence of a plan would be a reductio ad
absurdum and would make a "'mockery of' NEPA."70
An independent study" which examined EISs prepared by state
and local authorities concluded that the main inadequacy was the
lack of data being collected at the local level on social, economic,
and environmental issues.72 The authors found the repetition of
identical phrases, paragraphs, and even pages in impact statements
for different urban highway projects, and pointed to the inadequacy
of almost all the statements.73
This "objectivity" issue was the real basis for the Conservation
Society and Swain decisions.74 However, the impetus for the passage
of the Act, which was intended to overrule them, were the more
practical considerations of loss of significant employment due to
69. 403 F. Supp. 260 (D. N.H. 1975).
70. Id. at 271. Senator Edmund Muskie and former Secretary of Transportation John
Volpe have voiced similar doubts. Muskie, referring to his own experience with the Maine
Highway Commission while Governor, said:
I am concerned as to whether or not, in their responses to these procedures, the State
highway departments would be in a position to truly take into account-from an
informed point of view-the environmental questions that are involved . . . .I am
recalling my own experience as Governor. The highway planning that is done at the
State level, I suspect, will make it difficult-with the best of good will-to provide an
environmental input to State planning which will adequately surface environmental
questions for the benefit of national policy here in Washington.
Hearings on the NEPA Relative to Highways Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970).
71. See Sullivan & Montgomery, Surveying Highway Impact, ENVIRONMENT, Nov., 1972,
at 13.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Id.
74. In so deciding, these two circuits disagreed with four other circuit courts, which failed
to find the same dangers, instead approving the delegation procedure. Movement Against
Destruction v. Volpe, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality,
Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484
F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Conservation Socy' has been
reconsidered by the Second Circuit in the light of the Act. Over a strong dissent, it was
decided that the EIS which had been submitted complied with the procedure allowed by the
Act. Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Volpe, No. 73-2629, (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 1976). The remaining
circuits have not decided the issue.
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Conservation Society and the administrative confusion which re-
sulted when the two courts chose to require independent federal EIS
preparation.75 By permitting state EIS preparation Congress risks
the same dangers that motivated the Conservation Society and
Swain courts to decide as they did. Objectivity of the state agencies
is an aspect not very susceptible to control and will require ever-
vigilant federal officials.
VI. Conclusion
The Act has already had, and will continue to have, an important
streamlining effect in the EIS preparation procedure. However, the
courts and interested citizens' groups must exercise continued care
that this streamlining is not at the expense of environmental cir-
cumspection. Federal responsibility and the need for Federal partic-
ipation have been strongly reemphasized, but that reemphasis itself
should serve as a warning signal.
By allowing, and almost assuring, increased federal-state inter-
play in the EIS process, the Act should result in an increased
amount of local-level government and citizen input. This should
prove environmentally and governmentally healthy.
With the Highway Act of 1973, wider and more in-depth consider-
ation of alternatives should be demanded of highway planners, not
only as to minor cosmetics and routing of their projects, but also as
to alternative modes of moving goods and people.
Thomas McDonough, Jr.
75. SEN. REP. No. 152, supra note 38. Because of the question whether the opinion in
Conservation Soc'y changed the law for preparation of EISs in the three Second Circuit states
or found that the facts in the case did not support the generally accepted legal requirements,
the FHWA stopped the processing of major highway projects in New York, Connecticut and
Vermont. Id. "More than $2.3 billion in highway construction and nearly 215,000 potential
jobs were frozen." HIGHWAY USERS FEDERATION REPORTER, May, 1975, at 3. Congressmen
from the affected district, concerned about unemployment in an already suffering construc-
tion industry, introduced legislation to clarify the procedure. The original proposal, H.R.
3787, was directed particularly at the DOT, the highway industry and the three Second
Circuit states; it died because of these limitations. The subsequent Swain decision, agreeing
with Conservation Soc'y and mandating independent federal preparation of the EIS for the
Seventh Circuit states, required its expansion. So, to foreclose further judicial intervention
on the delegation issue and to quell uncertainties which might sacrifice employment
opportunities, Act was passed.

